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ABSTRACT
Military-grade cryptography has been widely available at no cost for personal and commercial
use since the early 1990s. Since the introduction of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), more and
more people encrypt files and devices, and we are now at the point where our smartphones
are encrypted by default. While this ostensibly provides users with a high degree of privacy,
compelling a user to provide a password has been interpreted by some courts as a violation
of our Fifth Amendment protections, becoming an often insurmountable hurdle to law
enforcement lawfully executing a search warrant. This paper will explore some of the issues
around this complex legal and social issue, including the evolution in the use of digital
cryptography and the evolving legal interpretations of privacy.
Keywords: Cryptography, Fifth Amendment, Law, Passwords, Privacy, Self-incriminating
testimony

1.

INTRODUCTION

While addressing cybersecurity conference
attendees at Boston College in 2017, thenFBI Director James Comey observed that
the ubiquitous availability and use of strong
cryptography was upsetting the delicate balance between privacy and security that is
at the very heart of the U.S. social contract
(Armerding, 2017). In 2019, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance, Jr. testified that
strong iPhone encryption was Apple’s "gift to
sex traffickers" ("Written Testimony", 2019,
para. 13). Today’s digital cryptography truly
is military-grade and provides an often insurmountable barrier for law enforcement when
c 2020 JDFSL

trying to execute a search warrant. This
raises several questions:
1. How do we, as a society, feel about citizens having access to strong encryption
and devices that are impervious to a
government-sanctioned search?
2. Did the authors of the Constitution
envision a container that could never
be opened and, therefore, never be
searched?
3. Is compelling a user to provide a password a violation of Fifth Amendment
protections?
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4. Should crypto products have backdoors
for just these reasons?
This paper will explore these issues by examining the growing capabilities of cryptography (Section 2) and the evolving interpretation of privacy and self-incrimination (Section
3). Section 4 will discuss some of the issues
as privacy and the needs of the state collide.
Section 5 will provide some conclusions.

2. SOME MAJOR
EVENTS IN DIGITAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY
Cryptography is the science of writing in secret codes. Most historians point to the use
of non-standard hieroglyphics in Egypt in
1900 B.C.E. as the beginning of secret code
writing although that practice probably appears spontaneously soon after writing was
developed (Kahn, 1996; Singh, 1999).
For several thousand years, the primary
use of cryptography was for secrecy (aka privacy and confidentiality). It was also the
exclusive domain of the literate and, even
then, employed almost solely at the nationstate level to protect diplomatic communication and military secrets (Kahn, 1996; Singh,
1999).
While many advances in cryptographic
codes appeared in the 1800s, one of the most
notable practical contributions came from
Auguste Kerckhoffs, a Dutch linguist and
cryptographer. In 1883, Kerckhoffs proposed
a number of design principles for military ciphers. One that maintains significance today
says that the cryptographic system must not
rely upon the secrecy of the encryption algorithm but upon the judicious choice, use,
and storage of the keys. In fact, it is best to
assume that the enemy knows the algorithm
(Kahn, 1996; Kerckhoffs, 1883a, 1883b).
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Cryptography continued to play a major
role in diplomatic and military communication in the 20th century, playing a key role in
the military campaigns of both World Wars
(Haufler, 2003; Yardley, 1931). Commercial
use of crypto, while introduced in the 1920s,
started to grow so rapidly in the post-WW II
era that the U.S. and most of the allied countries limited its use by civilians. In the U.S.,
in particular, cryptography was classified as a
munition, which placed strict export controls
on those products (Kahn, 1996; Levy, 2001).
The 1950s saw the dawn of the computer
age in commercial organizations, notably in
the financial industry. In the early 1970s, the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS, now the
National Institute of Standards and technology [NIST]) put out a call for a national standard encryption scheme for use with computers. The Data Encryption Standard (DES),
designed by IBM and derived from an earlier
IBM cipher called Lucifer, was adopted in
1977 and published as Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) Publication 46.
The National Security Agency (NSA) had
input into the development of DES, which
caused many to wonder if they had implemented some sort of backdoor, a purposeful weakening of the algorithm to make is
more susceptible to certain kinds of attack.
Ironically, the NSA-designed Substitution
(S)-boxes removed a mathematical weakness,
making the algorithm stronger. However,
IBM offered both 56- and 128-bit key versions of DES and the NSA insisted upon use
of the smaller key, making it more susceptible
to brute force attacks (Schneier, 2004).
Upon adoption, DES became the newest
secret key cryptography (SKC) scheme. SKC,
also called symmetric cryptography, uses a
single key for both encryption and decryption.
The key, then, is a shared secret between the
sending and receiving parties. An important
aspect of SKC schemes is the process of key
exchange; specifically, how do the sender and
c 2020 JDFSL
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receiver share the key and keep it a secret?
In 1977, the best way might be for one party
to write it down and send it by armored car
to the other party, using the same keys for
days or weeks at a time (Kahn, 1996; Singh,
1999).
During this same era, Whitfield Diffie and
Martin Hellman proposed a new form of
encryption called public key cryptography
(PKC). Also called asymmetric cryptography,
PKC employs two keys, one to encrypt and
the other to decrypt. Although the two keys
are mathematically related and created as a
pair, deriving the value of one of the keys
by knowing the value of the other is computationally infeasible. Thus, one of the keys
could be widely published and shared, known
as the public key, while the other key remained a closely held private key (Diffie &
Hellman, 1976).
The description of PKC was widely hailed
as the biggest advance in encryption in hundreds of years. For 4,000 years, encryption was used almost solely to keep secrets.
PKC could also provide sender authentication, message integrity, key exchange, and
non-repudiation. In terms of key exchange
alone, public key methods allowed secret keys
to be generated and exchanged in milliseconds (Kahn, 1996; Levy, 2001).
PKC depends upon the existence of trapdoor functions. In this context, a trapdoor
(as opposed to a backdoor ) refers to a mathematical function that is easy to compute
but where the inverse function is significantly
harder to calculate; e.g., it is easier to perform exponentiation than it is to calculate
logarithms and multiplication is easier than
factorization. The first workable PKC algorithm was published by Rivest, Shamir, and
Adleman (1978) and led to the first commercial PKC product, RSA.
In June 1991, Phil Zimmermann uploaded
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) to the Internet.
PGP was the first open cryptosystem, comc 2020 JDFSL
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bining hashing, compression, SKC, and PKC
into a method to protect files, devices, and
e-mail. Public keys were shared via a concept
known as a Web of Trust; individuals would
directly exchange their public keyrings and
then share their keyrings with other trusted
parties (Zimmermann, 2001).
PGP secret keys, however, were 128 bits
or larger, making it a strong cryptography
product. Export of strong crypto products
without a license was a violation of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
and, in fact, Zimmermann was the target
of an FBI investigation from February 1993
to January 1996. Yet, in 1995, perhaps as
a harbinger of the mixed feelings that this
technology engendered, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) awarded Zimmermann
the Pioneer Award and Newsweek Magazine
named him one of the 50 most influential
people on the Internet (Sussman, 1995; Zimmermann, n.d.).
With the commercialization of the Internet and dawning of the World Wide Web
in the early 1990s, the government realized
that there were legitimate needs for public
use of strong cryptography. But not without government oversight. In 1993, at the
same time as the Zimmermann investigation,
NIST and the NSA introduced the Capstone
project to provide strong crypto for public
use. Capstone comprised several components
(Crypto Museum, 2018; Kessler, 2020):
1. Skipjack: An SKC block cipher using an
80-bit key, the design of which was classified (a violation of Kerckhoffs’ design
principle described above)
2. Clipper: A tamper-proof computer chip
that ran Skipjack, designed with a
government-accessible backdoor
3. Escrowed Encryption Standard (ESS):
A scheme whereby private keys would
Page 3
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be escrowed by NIST and the Treasury
Dept.
Irrespective of the government’s intentions,
pushback against Capstone from privacy advocates and critics of its poor cryptographic
practices – including the discovery of a flaw in
the Clipper chip’s law enforcement backdoor
– resulted in the termination of the project by
1996 (Blaze, 1994; Meeks, 1994). Ultimately,
Capstone was never adopted (EPIC, n.d.b).
By 1995,
electronic-commerce (ecommerce) started to blossom on the
Internet. At that time, many people –
including the first author of this paper –
were actually sending credit card numbers
and other private information in unencrypted emails. All of this changed in
1995 with Netscape’s release of the Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, an encryption
enhancement employed by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) in Web servers
and browsers that were fundamental to
supporting the growth of commercial activity
on the Internet. Because export of 128-bit
keys was still prohibited, browsers in this era
– including Internet Explorer and Netscape –
had a domestic version with 128-bit keys and
an international version with 40-bit keys. In
1996, however, President Bill Clinton issued
Executive Order (EO) 13026, re-classifying
crypto products as technology rather than
munition, which greatly relaxed export
controls and key sizes (Clinton, 1996; U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, 2000).
While this sea change was ongoing in the
mid-1990s, Blaze, Diffie, Rivest, Schneier,
Shimomura, Thompson, and Wiener (1996)
released a white paper demonstrating that 56bit keys were too short for practical, commercial purposes and that SKC schemes needed
to use longer keys (Figure 1). Given that
DES had had a 20-year lifetime in 1996, they
concluded that the minimum key size for another twenty years was at least 75 bits.
Page 4
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Showing that 56-bit keys were insufficient
was also a harbinger that the useful life of
DES was coming to an end. In March 1998,
NIST reaffirmed the DES standard for use for
one additional five-year cycle but stated that
a new standard would be developed. In July,
however, the EFF introduced Deep Crack, a
chip that could be built for $220K and brute
force a DES key in an average of 4.5 days
(EFF, 1998). This development effectively
killed DES and caused a scramble as interim
fixes and variants to DES became available
(Kessler, 2020).
The process of developing NIST’s nextgeneration SKC standard, called the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), started
in 1997. The AES process was handled very
differently from the one that gave us DES.
Whereas DES was developed under a shroud
of secrecy, the AES process was an open,
international competition. Fifteen proposals were submitted and reviewed, with all
algorithms, documentation, and tests were
posted on a NIST Web site. In 2001, an algorithm named Rijndael (developed by Belgian
cryptographers Joan Daemen and Vincent
Rijmen) – employing a 128-, 192-, or 256-bit
key – was adopted as FIPS Pub. 197 (NIST,
2018).
It is worth noting several other crypto developments that occurred in the 2000s. Apple’s Mac OS X, based on the Unix operating
system, became available in 2001 (Painter,
2019). Mac OS X 10.3 (Panther) introduced
FileVault in 2003, which could encrypt a
user’s home directory (Apple Inc., 2003). FileVault 2, a re-design of the original, was released in 2011 with Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion)
and supported full startup volume encryption. This product was one of the first to
employ AES encryption (Apple Inc., 2018;
OSXDaily, n.d.).
In 2004, TrueCrypt, open source encryption for Windows, MacOS, and Linux, was
released (TrueCrypt, 2015). TrueCrypt proc 2020 JDFSL
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Figure 1. Effective key lengths for commercial applications (Adapted from Blaze et al., 1996)
vided a novel capability called plausible deniability (Figure 2). When a TrueCrypt encrypted volume is created, the user can define
a single encrypted container or two encrypted
containers using different passwords. Because
the encrypted volume is randomized, it is
not possible to tell whether there is a single
container or two. If somehow compelled to
provide a password, a user can supply the
password to the standard TrueCrypt volume
and there is no way to know if there is a hidden volume within (TrueCrypt Foundation,
2012). (On 28 May 2014, the TrueCrypt Web
site suddenly went dark, announcing that the
software was no longer being maintained and
that users should seek alternatives. The story
of TrueCrypt and the software that followed
is beyond the scope of this paper but certainly
an interesting twist.)
With the growth in the use of smartphones
and the prodigious amount of personal information they contain, default encryption of
c 2020 JDFSL

these devices was inevitable. In 2014, Apple announced that iOS 8 devices would be
encrypted by default and Google announced
the same for Android 5.0 (Lollipop) (Miller,
2014).

3. SOME MAJOR
EVENTS IN THE
NOTIONS OF PRIVACY
Although the word "privacy" never appears
in the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights,
Zimmermann – the author of PGP – suggests
that privacy is an inalienable right that was
understood by the framers (1999). Given
the technology available in the late-1780s,
any two people having a conversation knew
whether they had privacy or not simply by
looking around; if a third person came within
earshot, the two people could merely walk
away. The printed word was always visible. People had privacy because physics supPage 5
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Figure 2. Plausible deniability in TrueCryp
ported it; the framers would no more discuss
the right of privacy than they would the right
to breathe air.
Most people today associate our expectation of privacy with the Fourth Amendment:

The Fourth Amendment protects against
overly invasive government searches but also
provides guidelines around when the government can access an individual’s personal effects. In particular, a search is an:
1. Action by the state

The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized (U.S. Const. amend.
IV).
One hundred years after the ratification of
the U.S. Constitution, the invention of the
camera – and an invasive press – brought
the concept of privacy into public discussion.
The right to privacy was first described by
Warren and Brandeis (1890) and introduced
the foundational concept that most Americans just want the "right to be let alone."
Page 6

2. Infringes upon one’s reasonable expectation of privacy
3. Is legal only if there is a search warrant
or a valid warrant exception
In this regard the Fourth Amendment can
be viewed as involving a level of "taking"
some level of privacy by a government entity.
The understanding of Fourth Amendment
protections has changed over time with the
current decisional law suggesting that they
apply to people, not places (Katz v. U.S.,
1967; Olmstead v. U.S., 1928). Katz also
provides a guideline of what "reasonable expectation of privacy" means; namely, a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable. This standard is met if
c 2020 JDFSL
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a person expects privacy (subjective) and
society agrees that that expectation is reasonable (objective). As an example, a person
standing inside of an enclosed, glass phone
booth might have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for a telephone conversation but
probably does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy if they are taking their clothes
off.
The Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA, 1986), which governs electronic
surveillance in the United States, has always
drawn a distinction between user data and
transactional data. User data, also called
content, is the information that is under direct control of the user, such as the words
typed into a file or words said during a telephone conversation. Transactional data, also
called non-content, is the metadata needed by
an entity such as a communications carrier,
file system, or operating system to actually
control or manage the data flow. The distinction between user content and metadata
is consistent with the established legal doctrines regarding the privacy of content and
the sharing of date under the third-party doctrine. By refusing to include content in the
electronic surveillance data, the traditional
Katz doctrine is being followed. Similarly, allowing metadata to be included in electronic
surveillance comports with the third-party
doctrine.
The third-party doctrine emanated from
Smith v. Maryland (1979). In this case,
Smith stole a woman’s purse. A few days
later, the woman started to receive harassing phone calls. Following the procedures of
the ECPA, police placed a trap and trace
device on her line to determine the numbers
calling the woman; this process linked calls
to Smith’s number. Again, following ECPA
provisions, police placed a pen register on
Smith’s line, showing that he was calling the
woman. Smith was arrested, tried, and convicted. He appealed the conviction by assertc 2020 JDFSL

JDFSL V15N3

ing his expectation that his telephone calls
were private. The Court upheld conviction,
noting that a) police did not view the content
of his calls and b) he had already shared the
fact that he was calling the woman with a
third party, namely the telephone company.
These points are important to this discussion largely because metadata is typically
not encrypted while content might be. Thus,
metadata would seemingly always be available to law enforcement; it is content where
the issue of encryption might be directly at
issue. And content is where incriminating
and exculpatory evidence of crime would be
found.
The Fifth Amendment addresses,
among other things, issues related to
self-incriminating testimony and says, in
part, "No person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself"
(U.S. Const. amend. V). This concept was
novel at the time because the prevailing
jurisprudence in the 1700s was that a suspect
was guilty until proven innocent. The U.S.
system of criminal justice is based upon the
notion that a defendant is innocent until
proven guilty and the state has the burden
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In this way, the Fifth Amendment can be
seen as protecting against a person having to
"give" evidence. Not forcing a defendant to
testify is a way of implementing this precept;
a criminal suspect does not have to speak
and not speaking is not an implication of
guilt.
Fisher v. U.S. (1976) introduced two relevant clarifications to Fifth Amendment protections, namely the Act of Production Doctrine and the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine.
The Act of Production Doctrine says that a
compelled act is testimonial when the act asserts information – i.e., the contents of one’s
mind – with some aspect of communication.
In this case, the Court observed that doing
something can convey information the same
Page 7

JDFSL V15N3

as saying something. Thus, if a teacher asks
a group of students to raise their hands if
they read a certain paper, the act of raising
the hand is testimonial since it conveys information that is in the students’ heads. Courts
have, therefore, come to interpret the Fifth
Amendment as protecting both forms of compulsion, namely, testimony and production.
It is important to note that knowing a
password and knowing the contents of an
encrypted device are two different things. It
is often the case people besides the owner of
a device may know or be aware of the code
needed to unlock the device; family members
and friends, for example, often exchange or
share this information for myriad reasons.
Therefore, knowledge of a password is not a
valid test that the person actually knows the
contents and, therefore, is not in and of itself
incriminating.
The Act of Production Doctrine considers
a person’s communication implicit in the act,
not what communications may result from
the act. How incriminating the production
may be, or what the computer does when a
person unlocks is, does not change the testimony implicit in the act of unlocking it. In
re Search Warrant Application (2017) notes
that use of biometry to access a device does
not gain testimonial significance based on
the information revealed; such an argument
"...relies on conflating what it means for an
act to be inherently testimonial versus an act
yielding an incriminating result" (Section II,
para. 11). In a sense, the passcode is akin to
a fingerprint or a physical key; it can be used
to open the device to further exploration, but
neither the code nor the fingerprint nor the
physical key creates any information to be
decrypted; the information either exists or it
doesn’t irrespective of the unlocking of the
device. Thinking of the issue in this regard
overcomes the dichotomy of being able to
use a fingerprint to unlock a device, but not
obtain a passcode.
Page 8
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The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine says
that compelling a person to produce information under certain circumstances is not testimonial if the state already, independently
knows that the person has the information.
So, as an example, if the state compels a person to open a safe by using a combination,
the act of entering the correct combination is
not incriminating testimony that the person
knows the combination if the state can show
that it had authentic, a priori knowledge
that the person knew the combination. The
elements of the Forgone Conclusion Doctrine
are met when:
1. The state has knowledge of the existence in some specified location of the
demanded evidence (reasonable particularity)
2. The person is known to have possessed
or controlled the evidence
3. The evidence is authentic
The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine has two
elements that apply more to the access to and
acceptance of physical documents than to digital passwords. Reasonable particularity, the
first such element, is a level of specificity that
does not really apply to passwords; the state
is seeking a single password with which to access a single device (Commonwealth v. Jones,
2019; Kerr, 2018; U.S. v. Spencer, 2018).
The other element, authenticity, should not
be an issue with passwords since they are
self-authenticating; if the password works, it
is clearly authentic (Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 2014; In the Matter of the Search, 2018;
State of Florida v. Stahl, 2016).
Doe v. U.S. (1988) provides additional insight into when Fifth Amendment protections
attach. According to Doe, "...an accused’s
communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information" (Doe, para. 3) in order to be
c 2020 JDFSL
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considered testimonial. Thus, Fifth Amendment privileges can only be invoked when
these three elements apply:
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ruled that if an individual produces such documents pursuant to a grant of immunity, the
government may not use them to pursue additional criminal charges against that person.

1. Compulsion
2. Testimonial communication or act
3. Incrimination
Without these components, there is no
Fifth Amendment issue. Per Doe (1988),
"If a compelled statement is ’not testimonial
and for that reason not protected by the privilege, it cannot become so because it will
lead to incriminating evidence’" (footnote 6).
This relates to the question about whether
providing a passcode is testimonial. If the initial compelled communication is testimonial,
then any derivative evidence would be inadmissible; if, however, such information is not
testimonial, then any derivative information
would be properly admitted into evidence.
U.S. v. Hubbell (2000) further clarifies
the limits of the Fifth Amendment. As part
of a plea agreement, Hubbell agreed to provide certain documents relevant to a government investigation. After the government issued a subpoena to Hubbell to produce those
documents, he asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before a Grand Jury. The prosecutor obtained
a court order for the documents and offered immunity to Hubbell who, in turn, provided the documents, thus was in compliance with the original plea bargain. The government then used the documents to indict
Hubbell for additional crimes. The Supreme
Court dismissed the indictment, observing
that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination protects an individual from
being compelled to disclose the existence
of, much less produce, incriminating documents of which the prosecution has no a
priori knowledge, thus is unable to describe
with reasonable particularity. The Court also
c 2020 JDFSL

4. PRIVACY V. THE
NEEDS OF THE STATE
The evolution and widespread availability of
strong cryptography made it inevitable that
an individual’s expectation of privacy would
be on a collision course with the legitimate
needs of the state to execute a valid search
warrant.

4.1

Compelling an Individual’s
Password

Since the early days of PGP, everyone from
pundits and researchers to legal scholars and
technocrats have wondered, "What happens
if law enforcement issues a search warrant
for an encrypted device and the user chooses
not to comply?" It took more than 15 years
for a court case to address this question
(Nakashima, 2008).
U.S. v. Boucher (2007, 2009) is the first
known case in the U.S. involving an encrypted computer and the question of selfincrimination. Boucher, a Canadian citizen,
was stopped at a U.S. border crossing in Vermont. Upon examination, images of child
pornography were found on his computer,
which was encrypted using PGP Desktop
software. The computer was powered down
upon seizure and was unable to be further examined by law enforcement (Cohen & Park,
2018; Nakashima, 2008; Sacharoff, 2018). Police then asked a judge to compel Boucher to
provide the password. In 2007, a U.S. Magistrate Judge ruled that compelling a password
violated Boucher’s Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination. Upon the
government’s appeal in 2009, a U.S. District
Judge ordered Boucher to supply police with
Page 9
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an unencrypted version of the hard drive. At
that point, Boucher accepted a plea agreement, was sentenced to three years in prison,
and then subsequently deported.
During public discourse of the various
Boucher rulings, many physical world analogies were made to this cyber world case. Most
notably, the password was the same as a key
to a locked room; providing the key is not
incriminating even if the contents of the room
are. But, in light of the Act of Production
Doctrine, is revealing the key’s location testimonial? One can be compelled to give a
fingerprint, cheek swab, hair sample, blood,
or other DNA; why not a password? But,
perhaps a more fundamental question: Did
the framers of the Constitution in 1878 ever
conceive of a Fourth Amendment container
that could not somehow be opened by physical means?
When applying for search warrants for
physical documents, the government needs to
meet the constitutional threshold of probable cause, i.e., that there is a fair probability
that a search will result in evidence of a crime
being discovered (U.S. Const. amend. IV).
The government must also, as specific as is
possible, describe the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized. The
standard for searching for data on a digital
device should not be higher. The standard
for compelling the production of a password
does not have to do with the eventual recovery of evidence. Rather, as some courts
have held, the proper question is whether
the government can demonstrate that it is a
foregone conclusion that the defendant can
decrypt the device (Kerr, 2018, 2019; U.S. v.
Apple MacPro Computer, 2017).
The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine was significant in the Boucher Order. Boucher accessed his laptop at the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent’s request
at the border, where the agent ascertained
the presence of child pornography. Because
Page 10
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of that act, the Government knew of the existence and location of the hard drive and its
files. Compelling Boucher to provide access
to the unencrypted drive did not add to the
sum total of the Government’s information
about the presence of possibly incriminating files (Kerr, 2019; Sacharoff, 2018; U.S. v.
Boucher, 2009).
In addition, Boucher’s act of producing
an unencrypted version of the drive was not
needed to authenticate it since he had already
admitted to possession of the computer and
provided the Government access to the drive.
Since the Government could link Boucher
with the files on his computer without making use of his production of an unencrypted
version of the drive and stated that it would
not use his act of production as evidence of
authentication, there was no violation of his
Fifth Amendment privileges (Kerr, 2018; U.S.
v. Boucher, 2009).
The Boucher case did not provide guidance
necessarily followed by other courts. In a
similar case five years later in Massachusetts,
suspect Gelfgatt was charged with multiple
counts of forgery. Relevant evidence was
known to be on his computers. Prior to
trial, a motion to compel Gelfgatt to "...enter his password into encryption software"
was denied by a Superior Court judge, who
referred the point of law to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). The SJC reversed the
denial, arguing that the motion violated neither the Fifth Amendment nor Article 12 of
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights since
the compelled decryption would not communicate facts of a testimonial nature beyond
what Gelfgatt had already admitted to investigators (Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 2014).
Yet, five years after that, the state issued
a Gelfgatt order for Jones – indicted for sex
trafficking – to "provide... in writing... the
PIN code" to a mobile phone (Commonwealth
v. Jones, 2019). But entering and revealing
a password are different things, and revealing
c 2020 JDFSL
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the password is not supported by Gelfgatt.
Once the Commonwealth changed the request
to entering the password, the order was upheld due to the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine
(Kerr, 2019).
Requiring the disclosure of a password
can be compared to the required disclosure
of a private document, which may have
some Fifth Amendment protection. The required oral disclosure of a password is often
equated to incriminating testimony which is
proscribed by the Fifth Amendment (Kerr,
2019).
Inconsistencies in rulings have appeared
within states and between federal courts.
Two cases in Florida provide a classic example. In State of Florida v. Stahl (2016),
Stahl was arrested for video voyeurism (in
this case, taking upskirt photos) in Sarasota.
Stahl gave consent for the search of his mobile
phone, confirmed the phone number, and provided police with the location of the phone –
and then withdrew consent. The State’s motion to compel Stahl to provide the password
to police officers was denied by the trial judge,
yet Florida’s Second District appellate court
quashed the trial judge’s order, allowing the
State to compel the password (Kerr, 2019).
In 2018, G.A.Q.L., a 17-year-old, was an
inebriated driver in a high-speed collision in
the southeastern part of the state, resulting
in the death of a passenger in his vehicle
(G.A.Q.L. v. State of Florida, 2018). The
State made a motion to compel an iPhone
7 and iTunes password pursuant to a search
warrant for the phone, for which they had
credible belief that relevant evidence would
be found. The trial court ordered the passwords to be provided, per Stahl. In this
case, Florida’s Fourth District appellate court
quashed the trial judge’s order, protecting
the password on Fifth Amendment grounds.
The appellate judges ruled that the Foregone
Conclusion Doctrine did not apply because
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the State did not show "reasonable particularity."
Given that two Florida appellate courts
have made different rulings, this question
will likely go to the Florida Supreme Court
at some point. The Court in G.A.Q.L.
openly disagreed with Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal and cited a U.S. 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals case that found that
the privilege against compelled decryption applies unless the government can describe the
incriminating files that are on the device with
reasonable particularity (In Re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 2012).
There are other cases that have resulted
in conflicting decisions, showing that there is
no clear precedent, among them:
1. U.S. v. Fricosu (2012): Citing the All
Writs Act, ordered the defendant to supply an unencrypted copy of an encrypted
hard drive for which the Government
had a search warrant.
2. U.S. v. Apple MacPro Computer (2017):
Found that compelled decryption did
not violate prior decisional law and did
not violate Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
3. U.S. v. Spencer (2018): Held that the
appropriate test to determine whether
the Foregone Conclusion Doctrine applied was whether the government could
show that it was a foregone conclusion
that the defendant could decrypt the
devices; if so, it allowed compelled decryption.
4. Seo v. State (2018): Found that ordering
the defendant to unlock a mobile phone
was a violation of Fifth Amendment
protections against self-incrimination,
largely because of the unlimited nature
of the search warrant and the fact that
the device is an intimate record of a
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person’s thoughts and actions. The ruling was upheld by the Indiana Supreme
Court in 2020 (Lee, 2020; Seo v. State,
2020).
It seems that inconsistencies at the Federal
level (e.g., Boucher, in the U.S. 2nd Circuit,
conflicts with In Re Grand Jury Subpoena,
decided in the U.S. 11th Circuit) suggest
that this issue has to eventually be adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. One
could argue that the Supreme Court has already missed one opportunity to address this
question. The defendant in Commonwealth v.
Jones (2019) filed a writ of certiorari with the
Court in 2019 (Reidy & Nathanson, 2019).
The specific questions in the writ were:
Does the Fifth Amendment’s act of production doctrine apply to compelled decryption?
If so, what does the foregone conclusion exception to the act of production doctrine require the government to show before an order
to compel decryption can issue? (Reidy &
Nathanson, p. i)
Public defenders in Massachusetts filed an
amicus curiae brief arguing that Fisher’s ruling regarding the Act of Production Doctrine
should not be applied to compelled decryption (Rangaviz, 2019). The Supreme Court
declined to hear the case as they denied certiorari (U.S. Supreme Court, 2019).

4.2

Product and Encryption
Backdoors

In December 2015, a mass shooting in San
Bernardino, California resulted in 14 people being killed and an additional 21 people
wounded. The shooters – a married couple
– were both killed in a shootout with police.
According to FBI investigators, the couple
were lone operator terrorists; "homegrown
violent extremists" radicalized over several
years of consuming "poison on the Internet"
and inspired by foreign terrorist groups committed to jihadism and martyrdom, yet not
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directed by any particular group (Schmidt &
Pérez-Peña, 2015).
The FBI believed that access to the iPhone
5C found in the couple’s vehicle would advance their investigation. As iPhone encryption has evolved, law enforcement has requested assistance from Apple many times to
retrieve information so as to advance criminal investigations. When Apple complied,
it employed existing capabilities to access
the devices (Cohen & Park, 2018; Sacharoff,
2018).
In 2016, the Court issued an order requiring a custom operating system be created and
installed by Apple without unlocking or otherwise changing the data on the phone (In re
Apple AWA Order, 2016). What was new in
this request was that Apple was asked to develop a new capability to break the advanced
security features found in Apple’s devices.
The basis of the FBI’s request to Apple was
the All Writs Act of 1789 that allows the government to issue all necessary and appropriate orders in the furtherance of their rightful
duties (In re Apple AWA Application, 2016).
Apple opposed the order on the grounds that
it was unlawful and unconstitutional because
it essentially conscripted Apple into writing
hacking code for the government. Further,
they argued that if the order was granted,
it would undermine the security of all Apple
devices and set a dangerous precedent for future cases (Cohen & Park, 2018; EPIC, n.d.a;
In re Apple Motion to Vacate, 2016). Subsequently, the FBI found another way into the
phone and the matter was dropped (Blum,
2018; Cardozo & Crocker, 2018).
In December 2019, conflicts between the
government and Apple resurfaced after a terrorist shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola
(Florida). A member of the Saudi Arabian
military in flight training at the air station,
later found to have ties with al Qaeda, killed
three people and wounded eight others with
a handgun before being killed by responding
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authorities. Law enforcement wanted to gain
access to two of the assailant’s phones, an
iPhone 5 and iPhone 7. Attorney General
William Barr requested Apple’s assistance
in unlocking the phones and Apple, as in
the past, refused the government’s request.
A.G. Barr was very public in his displeasure
that Apple would not assist in this case while
Apple made it clear that they had assisted
the government in substantive ways, including responding rapidly to their requests and
turning over several terabytes of data; Apple
merely would not unlock the phones (Feiner,
2020; Lucas, 2020). Eventually, the FBI was
able to break into the phones and although
they opined that Apple’s assistance earlier on
would have been helpful, they did not address
what new type of information was recovered
(Brewster, 2020).
In early 2020, the U.S. Senate introduced
the Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies (EARN IT)
Act of 2020. While the umbrella mission "To
establish a National Commission on Online
Child Sexual Exploitation Prevention..." is
noble, the Trump Administration’s publicly
stated rationale is because child predators
use virtually unbreakable encryption (S.3398,
2020). Of course, so do terrorists and criminals, as well as journalists, political activists,
victims of domestic abuse, and other ordinary
citizens. While the EARN IT Act does not
specifically address encryption, it provides a
clear path for the government to force content platforms to eliminate its use (Newman,
2020; Pfefferkorn, 2020).
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) holds Internet social media
services, such as Facebook and Twitter, immune from liability for the content on their
unmoderated platforms. Thus, if Party A defames Party B on Facebook or Twitter, Party
B can sue Party A but cannot sue Facebook
or Twitter (47 U.S. Code §?230, 1996). Without Section 230 protections, it is unlikely that
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social media platforms would exist as they
do today (for good or for bad).
The EARN IT Act would remove Section
230 immunity unless social media and other
content-hosting platforms comply with a set
of guidelines that would be created by an
unelected National Commission and could be
changed unilaterally at the whim of the U.S.
Attorney General. Furthermore, these guidelines are not laws or rules that go through
any legislative or formal rulemaking process,
although compliance with them provides immunity to the provider (Pfefferkorn, 2020).
Clearly, this approach provides a way to
incent – or coerce – platforms to do what
the Government wants them to do (Cope,
Mackey, & Crocker, 2020).
A threat to the use of end-to-end encryption is not explicit in the EARN IT Act; in
fact, the only mention of the word "cryptography" is to require that two members of
the National Commission be knowledgeable
about the subject (S.3398, 2020). But the
potential is there for the commission to decide to limit the immunity of a platform that
employs end-to-end encryption (Pfefferkorn,
2020). It might also require content providers
to examine the content being posted, which
would not only bypass the use of encryption
but would also make the content provider
an agent of the state without a search warrant (Cope et al., 2020). At the time of this
paper’s submission, the bill is under consideration by the Senate (Ng, 2020).

5.

CONCLUSION

Even before the shooting in Pensacola, the
Apple-FBI conflict had re-energized the debate about the government’s need and ability
to get past strong encryption. Once again,
discussion started about requiring manufacturers to install backdoors in all encryption
products or on ways to ban end-to-end encryption. While this is an idea that might
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sound good on paper – as it did two decades
earlier – it is impossible to implement cryptographic backdoors without weakening the
overall security of any product (Abelson et
al., 2015). Many practical issues crop up, as
well, including (Claburn, 2019):
1. Who determines who the Good Guys are
that get access to the backdoor features?
2. How would use of the backdoor be controlled?
3. How would access to the backdoor ever
be rescinded?
But is this not the same idea that the government posed – and the marketplace rejected
– in the 1990s with Capstone (IEEE, 2018;
Stepanovich & Karanicolas, 2018; Young &
Yung, 1996)? And, yet, it seems to remain
an attractive idea to governments; as recently
as June 2019, senior members of the Trump
administration were exploring potential legislation to crack down on end-to-end encryption (Abel, 2019; Claburn, 2019). Indeed,
U.S. Attorney General William Barr and officials in Australia and the U.K. have warned
high-tech companies that continued use of
strong end-to-end encryption could result in
stronger regulations and laws limiting such
use ("Attorney General", 2019). Interestingly, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and Europol released
a joint statement in 2016 calling for mechanisms to circumvent commercial encryption
methods although they acknowledged that
weakened cryptography was not the correct
forward path ("On lawful", 2016).
A cryptographic backdoor is a slight variant on kleptography, the "...study of stealing information securely and subliminally"
(Young & Yung, 1997, p. 63). Unlike a
backdoor that weakens a crypto algorithm,
kleptography refers to an attack on a cryptosystem from within. Consider this examPage 14
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ple: Imagine a trusted, black box cryptosystem that generates PKC key pairs. Presumably, the private key cannot be derived from
the widely-distributed public key. Suppose
that a trapdoor function – called a Secretly
Embedded Trapdoor with Universal Protection (SETUP) – is embedded into the cryptosystem that allowed an attacker to access
or derive the private key from the public
key by weakening the key generation process (Esslinger, 2013; Young & Yung, 1996,
1997). For a practical application of kleptography, consider Edwards Snowden’s revelation in 2013 that the NSA deliberately
weakened NIST pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) standards, the methods at
the very heart of generating secret keys and
public key pairs (Zetter, 2013).
This paper poses several questions about
reconciling personal privacy with the legitimate needs of the state to conduct investigations. This paper is not intended to answer
those questions but to inform the debate.
Other related questions might include:
1. Were any of us – as citizens and consumers – ever asked what we wanted, in
terms of strong encryption?
2. Is the need for an individual’s personal
privacy superior to the State’s need to
investigate crimes?
3. Do we alter the government’s duty to
provide security with the implementation of processes that could block tools
used to reach that objective?
4. Is the subjective expectation of privacy
when using encryption so absolute that it
meets the "objectively reasonable" test?
In particular, does society agree?
5. How did we manage for the last 230 years
without this level of protection from the
State?
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6. Who gave Apple, Google, et al. the right
to have unilaterally made the decision
about use of strong cryptography without an informed debate?
7. How do we resolve conflicts between the
protections of two amendments?
The evolution of technology has always
moved faster than the legislative process and
the fact that both use a different vernacular
does not help in the mutual understanding
necessary for the implementation of good
laws and regulations (Kessler, 1999). Society,
however, cannot address these questions if
we are not having the discussion. We cannot
move forward toward any type of solution if
the various stakeholders continue to hold on
to decades-old arguments; our way of thinking about this topic must evolve since neither
technology nor the law can afford to stand
still.
In June 2020, the Lawful Access to Encrypted Data (LAED) Act was introduced in
the U.S. Senate (Bradbury, 2020; Committee
on the Judiciary, 2020; Franceschi-Bicchierai,
2020; S.4051, 2020). Legislators are again
insisting that technology companies insert
cryptographic backdoors into their products
and requires similar backdoors in any platform supporting end-to-end encryption, so
that they can comply with search warrants.
The debate continues.

6.
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State of Florida v. Stahl
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U.S. v. Spencer
Seo v. State
Commonwealth v. Jones
SCOTUS denies certiorari in Jones
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Seo v. State upheld
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2016
2017
2018

2019

Issues and events
Writing appears
Secret writing appears

Cryptography in WW I
Cryptography in WW II
Cryptography classified as a munition
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET)
PKC concept described
DES released
RSA described
National Science Foundation Network (NSFNET)
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Commercialization of the Internet
FBI starts Zimmermann investigation
Capstone program proposed
Zimmermann receives EFF Pioneer Award
SSL introduced
FBI closes Zimmermann investigation
Capstone project dead
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"Kleptography" defined
EFF Deep Crack chip: "DES is dead"
Commerce Dept. reclassifies cryptography
AES adopted
FileVault (home directory) released
TrueCrypt and plausible deniability released
FileVault 2 (full volume) released
Snowden revelations about NSA
Android 5.0 introduces default encryption
Apple iOS 8 introduces default encryption
San Bernardino terrorist shooting
FBI versus Apple
Crypto backdoors back in public discussion

NAS Pensacola terrorist shooting

2020
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